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Abstract: We concentrate on the problem of the provision of one pure public good
whenever agents that form the society have either single-plateaued preferences or
single-peaked preferences over the set of alternatives. We are interested in com-
paring the relationships between di⁄erent nonmanipulability notions under these two
domains. On the single-peaked domain, under strategy-proofness, non-bossiness is
equivalent to convexity of the range. Thus, minmax rules are the only strategy-proof
non-bossy rules. On the single-plateaued domain, only constant rules are non-bossy
or Maskin monotonic; but strategy-proofness and weak non-bossiness are equivalent
to weak Maskin monotonicity. Moreover, strategy-proofness and plateau-invariance
guarantee convexity of the range.
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We consider the problem of the provision of a single pure public good where
there are n agents in the society and the set of feasible alternatives is A = [0;1].
Each agent has either single-peaked or else single-plateaued preferences over
alternatives. Given that the set of available preferences for each agent is the
same, the provided level of public good is chosen by means of a social choice
function. We impose some strategic requirements over the decision procedure:
strategy-proofness, Maskin monotonicity, non-bossiness (or some variations of
them). Strategy-proofness assures us that no individual agent will gain by mis-
representing his true preferences. Maskin monotonicity (a necessary condition
for Nash implementation, see Maskin 1977, 1985, and 1999) tells us that no
single agent will be able to change the social outcome when changing his prefer-
ences in such a way that the lower contour set of the initial outcome under initial
preferences is a subset of the lower contour set of the initial outcome under new
preferences. In this paper we use the notion of non-bossiness for economies with
only pure public goods. Mainly, it says that no agent, by misrepresenting his
true preferences, can change the social outcome without changing the (ordinal)
utility it assigns to him under his initial preferences.
Concerning preferences domains, Barber￿ (2007) discusses the extent to
which allowing for agents to be indi⁄erent among alternatives may alter the
qualitative results that are obtained in social choice theory. Two of the most
well-known conditions that guarantee positive results in social choice are Dun-
can Black￿ s notion of single-peakedness, and the straightforward extension of
single-peakedness to allow for indi⁄erence, that is, single-plateaued preference
pro￿les, which allow individuals to be indi⁄erent among several consecutive best
alternatives.
Following the idea in Barber￿ (2007), in our framework of social choice
functions with these two domains, we examine logical relations between strategy-
proofness, Maskin monotonicity, non-bossiness, or some variations of them. We
discuss the relationships between these concepts when preferences pro￿les satisfy
the single-peaked condition and we investigate if such relationships keep holding
when we move to single-plateaued preference pro￿les. In our framework we
obtain that non-bossiness, or a weaker version of it that we call weak non-
bossiness, turn out to be crucial. In particular, such ￿ la non-bossy conditions
allow us to state the relationship between strategy-proofness and conditions ￿
la Maskin monotonicity in our main results (concretely, in Theorems 1 and 2
for single-peakedness and Theorem 3 for single-plateauedness).
Non-bossiness, formally introduced by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981),
has been largely studied in the literature for economies incorporating private
goods. However, as far as we know there are very few papers studying such
kind of conditions with only public goods. Ritz (1985) de￿nes the condition of
"noncorruptability", a strategic requirement on social choice correspondences,
and in particular on social choice functions. We name this condition weak
non-bossiness and it plays an important role in two of our main results where
we relate strategy-proofness and a weak version of Maskin monotonicity (see
1Theorems 2 and 3). A social choice function is weakly non-bossy (or equiva-
lently, "noncorruptible") if no agent can, by misrepresenting his true preferences,
change the social outcome without changing the value of it for himself. As we
argue and claim in the Concluding Remarks section, weak non-bossiness could
be very helpful to obtain closed characterization results for strategy-proof so-
cial choice function on the domain of single-peaked preferences without convex
range.
Non-bossiness and a di⁄erent weaker version of it have been recently used in
Saijo, Sj￿str￿m, and Yamato (2007) to analyze double implementation (that is,
implementation in both dominant strategies and Nash equilibria) in a general
social choice framework incorporating ours. We call their weaker condition quasi
non-bossiness since in our framework, and under strategy-proofness, it is in fact
equivalent to our non-bossiness.
With the aim of establishing a relationship between strategy-proofness and a
type of ￿ la Maskin condition for social choice functions on single-plateaued pref-
erences in subsection 3.2, we consider two ways of relaxing Maskin monotonicity
that we call weak Maskin monotonicity and plateau-invariance. The ￿rst one
weakens the idea of an "improvement" implicit in the very same de￿nition of
Maskin monotonicity. Plateau-invariance is part of Moulin￿ s (1984) strong-
uncompromisingness (in particular, his parts (iv) and (v)) and not requiring ￿
la Maskin "improvements" to all the alternatives in the range but only to those
that are the most preferred alternatives for some agent.
As previously mentioned, in this paper we show that non-bossiness plays an
important role combined with strategy-proofness in the characterization of social
choice functions in our framework with single-peaked preferences. Theorem 1
shows that under strategy-proofness, a social choice function on single-peaked
preferences is non-bossy if and only if its range is convex. Moreover, it also
rea¢ rms the family of minmax rules characterized by Moulin (1980)1 on a single-
peaked domain as an important class of rules. In particular, these rules are also
the unique ones that are non-bossy and strategy-proof.
The result in Theorem 1 does not hold on a single-plateaued domain. As
we show in Proposition 1, on a single-plateaued domain only constant rules are
non-bossy. We may, however, insist on a non-bossy type concept and move to
the weaker concept of weak non-bossiness. Then, we are able to relate strategy-
proofness and Maskin monotonicity. Theorem 2 shows that on a single-peaked
domain a social choice function is strategy-proof and weakly non-bossy if and
only if it is Maskin monotonic.
This result does not hold either on the single-plateaued domain. Note that
Proposition 1 excludes dictatorial social choice functions, in particular, only con-
stant social choice functions are admissible under Maskin monotonicity. Given
1Moulin (1980) characterized on the single-peaked domain the class of minmax rules by
using strategy-proofness and peak-onlyness (that is, the best alternative is the unique relevant
information of agents￿preferences). Ching (1998) used a continuity axiom instead of peak-
onlyness (and called the same class of rules as augmented median voter rules) while Sprumont
(1995) (in his Theorem 2.4) used convexity of the rule￿ s range to characterize the same class
of rules.
2Proposition 1 we show that, for single-plateaued preferences, the relation Maskin
monotonicity implies strategy-proofness vacuously holds. To obtain a counter-
part result to Theorem 2, we use the two proposed ways of relaxing Maskin
monotonicity. Theorem 3 shows that on the single-plateaued domain a so-
cial choice function is strategy-proof and weakly non-bossy if and only if it is
weakly Maskin monotonic. Finally, we explore the second way to relax Maskin
monotonicity, called plateau-invariance. In Proposition 2, we show that on a
single-plateaued domain any strategy-proof and plateau-invariant social choice
function is weakly non-bossy, thus weakly Maskin monotonic by Theorem 3.
With the same ￿ avour as Theorem 1, part (iii) in Proposition 2 guarantees
the convexity of the range of any strategy-proof and plateau-invariant rule on
single-plateaued preferences.
Related Literature
Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) show that Maskin monotonicity and strategy-
proofness are equivalent when preferences are the unrestricted strict domain.
Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) obtain strategy-proofness as a nec-
essary condition for Maskin monotonicity for their rich domains.2 There are
interesting papers in the literature analyzing the relationship among strategy-
proofness, Maskin monotonicity, and/or non-bossiness.3 However, as far as we
know, only three works deserve our attention concerning the relationship be-
tween strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity that embed or directly ana-
lyze the problem of the provision of only public goods. Shenker (1993) studies
the relationship between our three strategic axioms when agents￿preferences are
monotonically closed in a model dealing simultaneously with both the public and
the private goods case. However, his non-bossiness condition is Satterthwaite
and Sonnenschein (1981)￿ s one and thus it is trivially satis￿ed when analyzing
economies with only public goods. As said above we consider an alternative
de￿nition that has some bite for public goods.
Another paper closely related to ours is due to Takamiya (2007). He consid-
ers the same framework as ours and de￿nes two su¢ cient conditions that a do-
main of a social choice function should satisfy to have the property that coalition
strategy-proofness implies Maskin monotonicity and its converse. Our results
2See also Maskin and Sj￿str￿m (2002) for an alternative statement of this result.
3For example, Barber￿ and Jackson (1995) state for exchange economies that strategy-
proofness and non-bossiness implies coalition strategy-proofness (that is, no coalition of agents
can strictly gain by misrepresenting their preferences). Klaus (2001) in a problem of an assign-
ment of indivisible objects with single-dipped preferences obtains an equivalent result adding
some model speci￿c conditions to strategy-proofness. In cost sharing models non-bossiness has
also appeared as a relevant instrumental condition (see for instance, Moulin, 1994, Serizawa,
1999 and Mutuswami, 2005). PÆpai (2000) and Takamiya (2001) showed that non-bossiness
joint with strategy-proofness is equivalent to coalition strategy-proofness in the house alloca-
tion problem and in the Shapley-Scarf housing market with strict preferences, respectively.
Mizukami and Wakayama (2007b) study the relationship between Maskin monotonicity and
non-bossiness in a quite general economic framework. They obtain the equivalence between
Maskin monotonicity and non-bossiness joint with individual monotonicity whenever prefer-
ences domains are weakly monotonically closed. Although Mizukami and Wakayama￿ s model
encompasses exchange economies, housing markets, public and private good economies, etc.,
it does not encompass ours.
3are independent from his since the domain of single-peaked preferences does not
satisfy any of his domain conditions. Moreover, the domain of single-plateaued
preferences satis￿es only one of his conditions, the one required by Takamiya
to establish that Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness. However, we
will see that this relationship is vacuous since Maskin monotonicity is very de-
manding applied to our framework with single-plateaued preferences.
Recently, Bochet and Klaus (2008) have analyzed the relationship between
Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness in a general model that covers both
the private goods and the public goods setup. Like Takamiya (2007) they intro-
duce two su¢ cient conditions that a domain of a social choice function should
satisfy to guarantee that Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness and
the converse. Observe that neither single-plateaued nor single-peaked prefer-
ences satisfy their condition to guarantee that strategy-proofness implies Maskin
monotonicity. However, both domains satisfy their condition to guarantee that
Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness. For single-peaked preferences,
we independently state this result (see part of one implication of Theorem 2).
As mentioned above, for single-plateaued preferences, we show that this relation
is vacuous and trivially holds.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the model and de￿ni-
tions while Section 3 encompasses the main results. A summary of the results,
proposals for further research, and some comments form the Concluding Re-
marks section (Section 4). We gather the proofs of all results in Section 5.
2 The basic model and de￿nitions
Let A = [0;1] be the set of alternatives4 that stand for the feasible levels of
a public good, and N = f1;2;:::;ng be the set of agents (with n > 2) in the
society. Let capital letters S;T ￿ N denote subsets of agents while small letters
s;t their cardinality.
Let D denote the set of admissible preferences for each agent, that will be
a subset of continuous and convex preferences on A. Although we restrict to
ordinal preferences, we use utility functions to denote them. A preference pro￿le
is denoted by u = (u1;:::;un) 2 Dn or also by u = (uS;u￿S) 2 Dn when we
want to stress the role of a coalition S ￿ N, and then uS 2 Ds and u￿S 2 Dn￿s
denote the preferences of agents in S and in NnS, respectively.
In each de￿nition, D will refer to either one of the following domains: the set
of single-plateaued preferences (denoted by F) or else the set of single-peaked
preferences (denoted by S). That is, each property will be de￿ned for two
di⁄erent domains: F and S.
We now de￿ne a single-plateaued preference for any agent i 2 N.
De￿nition 1 A preference ui is single-plateaued if there exist p￿(ui), p+(ui) 2
A, p￿(ui) 6 p+(ui) such that [p￿(ui);p+(ui)] = fx 2 A : ui(x) > ui(y); for all
4All of our proofs can be easily adapted for a ￿nite set of alternatives and for R.
4y 2 Ag, and for any y;z 2 A such that y < z 6 p￿(ui), or p+(ui) ￿ z < y, then
ui(z) > ui(y).
The set of best alternatives for agent i according to ui, that is [p￿(ui);p+(ui)],
is denoted by ￿(ui) and called the plateau of ui. The domain of single-peaked
preferences, denoted by S, is a subdomain of F for which the plateau of a prefer-
ence ui is a singleton called the peak, say p(ui). That is, p￿(ui) = p+(ui) = p(ui)
for ui 2 S.
For some ui 2 D and for some x < p￿(ui) (respectively, x > p+(ui)),
let rui(x) be an alternative in A such that ui(x) = ui(rui(x)) if it exists and
rui(x) = 1 (respectively, 0) otherwise. Note that when rui(x) exists it is unique
since single-plateaued preferences do not allow for indi⁄erence between alterna-
tives in the same side of the plateau.
A social choice function (or also a rule) on Dn is a function f : Dn ! A.
Let Af denote the range of f.
The most well-known nonmanipulability property is strategy-proofness. Strategy-
proofness requires that the truth be a dominant strategy and it is a necessary
condition for implementation in dominant strategies (Gibbard, 1973). Strategy-
proofness assures that the rule will be immune to unilateral strategic behavior.
De￿nition 2 A social choice function f on Dn is strategy-proof if for any u 2
Dn, any i 2 N and any vi 2 D, ui(f(u)) > ui(f(vi;u￿i)). Otherwise, f is said
to be manipulable on Dn, concretely, manipulable by i at u via vi.
It is worth mentioning that if f is strategy-proof on Dn then Af is closed
(see Step 1 of Theorem 2￿ s proof in Zhou, 1991 and Lemma 1 in Barber￿ and
Jackson, 1994).
Another well-known condition in implementation theory is Maskin monotonic-
ity, a necessary condition for Nash implementation (see Maskin, 1977). A social
choice function is said to be Maskin monotonic if the outcome to be chosen
by the function does not vary whenever each individual switches his preference
keeping or improving the relative ranking of that outcome.
De￿nition 3 A social choice function f on Dn is Maskin monotonic if for
any u 2 Dn, for any i 2 N, and vi 2 D, if L(f(u);ui) ￿ L(f(u);vi) then
f(vi;u￿i) = f(u), where L(x;ui) = fy 2 A : ui(x) ￿ ui(y)g.5
Another property on rules related to the strategic behavior of agents is non-
bossiness. The usual notion of non-bossiness introduced by Satterthwaite and
Sonnenschein (1981) is trivially satis￿ed for any social choice function in eco-
nomic environments with only public goods. We use the notion of non-bossiness,
recently used by Saijo, Sj￿str￿m, and Yamato (2007), and stronger than the one
introduced by Ritz (1985) and called "noncorruptability", that has some bite
for public goods. Mainly, a non-bossy social choice function is a rule for which
5An alternative de￿nition more appropriate to work with weaker versions of Maskin
monotonicity is as follows. We say that f satis￿es Maskin monotonicity if and only if
8u;v 2 Dn; 8i 2 N, [8x 2 A; ui(f(u)) > ui(x) ) vi(f(u)) > vi(x)] ) f(vi;u￿i) = f(u).
5no individual can, by misrepresenting his preferences, change the social outcome
without changing the value of it for himself. Formally:
De￿nition 4 A social choice function f on Dn is non-bossy if for any i 2 N,
for any ui;vi 2 D, and u￿i 2 Dn￿1, ui(f(u)) = ui(f(vi;u￿i)) implies f(u) =
f(vi;u￿i).
We say that an agent can boss another agent around if, by changing her
announced utility, she can change the social outcome without changing her own
utility.6
Two di⁄erent natural weaker versions of non-bossiness can be considered.
None of them have been analyzed a lot in the literature of only public goods.
Saijo, Sj￿str￿m, and Yamato (2007) considered quasi non-bossiness7 that, joint
with strategy-proofness, assures in their general framework the possibility of
dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelation mecha-
nism. Weak non-bossiness was originally de￿ned by Ritz (1985) as "noncor-
ruptability" in a work where he studies the relationship between Arrow social
welfare functions and social choice correspondences. Below, we formally de￿ne
both properties.
De￿nition 5 A social choice function f on Dn is quasi non-bossy if for any
i 2 N, for any ui;vi 2 D, and u￿i 2 Dn￿1, if f(u) 6= f(vi;u￿i) then there is
some w￿i 2 Dn￿1 such that ui(f(ui;w￿i)) 6= ui(f(vi;w￿i)).
That is, we say that an agent is quasi a boss if, by changing her announced
utility, she can change the social outcome without changing her own utility
under both his original preferences independently of others￿preferences.
De￿nition 6 A social choice function f on Dn is weakly non-bossy if for any
i 2 N, for any ui;vi 2 D, and u￿i 2 Dn￿1, ui(f(u)) = ui(f(vi;u￿i)) and
vi(f(u)) = vi(f(vi;u￿i)) implies f(u) = f(vi;u￿i).
Mainly, an agent can weakly boss another agent around if, by changing her
announced utility, she can change the social outcome without changing her own
utility under both his original and ￿nal preferences.
Non-bossiness implies both weak non-bossiness and quasi non-bossiness by
de￿nition. However, the converse does not hold in our framework: neither weak
non-bossiness nor quasi non-bossiness imply non-bossiness. For both single-
peaked and single-plateaued preferences, consider the rule de￿ned in Example
2 below (see the details in the example).
A natural question refers to establishing in our framework a relationship be-
tween weak non-bossiness and quasi non-bossiness. It is worth mentioning that
6We could have adapted other existing formulations of non-bossiness for economies with
private goods. For example, instead of requiring that f(u) be equal to f(vi;u￿i), we could
require that f(u) be indi⁄erent to f(vi;u￿i) for all agents. Obviously this makes the condition
weaker. However, it is easy to check that on Sn and Fn under strategy-proofness both non-
bossy conditions are equivalent and we can use them indistinctly.
7The authors call it weak non-bossiness. See also Mizukami and Wakayama (2007a).
6in general these two properties are not related: In Example 6 we present a weakly
non-bossy rule violating both quasi non-bossiness and strategy-proofness. We
can also construct examples of quasi non-bossy rules violating both weak non-
bossiness and strategy-proofness8. However, as we will see below as a conse-
quence of Lemma 2 in the Appendix and part (iv) of Theorem 1 in Section 3,
under strategy-proofness, quasi non-bossiness and non-bossiness are equivalent
while weak non-bossiness is strictly weaker than non-bossiness.
With the aim of establishing a relationship between strategy-proofness and
a type of ￿ la Maskin condition for social choice functions on Fn in subsection
3.2, we consider two ways of relaxing Maskin monotonicity that we call weak
Maskin monotonicity and plateau-invariance. One weakens the idea of an "im-
provement" implicit in the very same de￿nition of Maskin monotonicity. The
other one, not requiring ￿ la Maskin "improvements" to all the alternatives in
the range but only to those that are the most preferred alternatives for some
agent.
We say that x improves ￿ la Maskin with respect to y for agent i when
moving from ui to vi if ui(x) ￿ ui(y) then vi(x) ￿ vi(y). Note that a Maskin
monotonic social choice function requires that for any alternative in the range,
say f(u), improving with respect to any other alternative for all agent when
moving from ui to vi, then the outcome does not change.
We say that x strictly improves with respect to y for agent i when moving
from ui to vi if ui(x) = ui(y) then vi(x) ￿ vi(y) and if ui(x) > ui(y) then
vi(x) > vi(y). With these ideas in mind we present our two properties related
to Maskin monotonicity. We say that a social choice function is weakly Maskin
monotonic if the outcome to be chosen by the function does not vary whenever
each individual switches his preference keeping or strictly improving the relative
ranking of that outcome.
De￿nition 7 A social choice function f on Dn is weakly Maskin monotonic if
for any i 2 N, for any ui;vi 2 D, u￿i 2 Dn￿1, and for all x 2 A, ui(f(u)) =
ui(x) implies vi(f(u)) > vi(x) and ui(f(u)) > ui(x) implies vi(f(u)) > vi(x)
then f(vi;u￿i) = f(u).
Observe that Maskin monotonicity implies weak Maskin monotonicity by de-
￿nition. Moreover, weak Maskin monotonicity is equivalent to Maskin monotonic-
ity on single-peaked preferences (see Lemma 1 below) but not on single-plateaued
ones (see the Concluding Remarks section).
Lemma 1 Any weakly Maskin monotonic social choice function on Sn is Maskin
monotonic.
The second condition that we call plateau-invariance was part of Moulin￿ s
(1984) strong-uncompromisingness (in particular, his parts (iv) and (v)). In his
Lemma 5, Moulin (1984) shows that his Generalized Condorcet winner choice
functions satisfy plateau-invariance.
8An example for single-peaked preferences is available upon request.
7De￿nition 8 A social choice function f on Dn is plateau-invariant if for any
i 2 N and u￿i 2 Dn￿1, the following holds:
(1) for any ui 2 F￿S; vi 2 F, if either f(u) 2 Interior[￿(ui)] and f(u) 2 ￿(vi)
or if f(u) = pe(ui) = pe(vi), for e being either f￿;+g, then f(u) = f(vi;u￿i),
and
(2) for any ui;vi 2 S such that f(u) = p(ui) = p(vi), then f(u) = f(vi;u￿i).
Note that for our two domains, strategy-proofness implies the second part
of the de￿nition of plateau-invariance. Moreover, for single-peakedness, part
(1) does not apply and part (2) is implied by peak-onlyness. Thus, strategy-
proofness implies plateau-invariance on Sn but the converse does not hold (see
Example 6 below). For single-plateaued preferences, neither strategy-proofness
implies plateau-invariance nor the converse (see the following examples).












Observe that f is strategy-proof but it does not satisfy plateau-invariance. To
show the failness of the last condition, let u 2 Fn such that ￿(uj) = [1
3; 2
3] for





, " 2 R+ being such that 1
3 + " < 1
2 and
let v3 2 F such that ￿(v3) = [1
3; 2
3]. Then, f(u) = 1
3 = p￿(u3) but f(v3;u￿3) =
1
2 6= f(u).
It is also interesting to observe that f has a convex range and it satis￿es weak
non-bossiness.
Example 2 Let ￿ 2 A. Then, for any u 2 Fn, let f(u) = ￿ if there ex-
ist k 2 N such that ￿ 2 ￿(uk). Otherwise, (that is, if for any i 2 N,
￿ = 2 ￿(ui)) compute A(u) = fl 2 N : d[￿(ul);￿] ￿ d[￿(ui);￿] for all i 2 Ng,
where d[￿(ul);￿] = minx2￿(ul) jx ￿ ￿j. Let a be the smallest j 2 A(u) and
let "(ua) > 0 such that ￿ + "(ua) < p￿(ua) if ￿ < p￿(ua) and ￿ ￿ "(ua) >
p+(ua) if ￿ > p+(ua). Then, let f(u) = "(ua) + ￿ when ua(1) > ua(0), and
f(u) = ￿ ￿ "(ua) when ua(1) ￿ ua(0).
This social choice function satis￿es plateau-invariance and weak non-bossiness
(note that it also satis￿es quasi non-bossiness). However, since f is manipula-
ble, by Theorem 3 below, f does not satisfy weak Maskin monotonicity. To show
that manipulations by single agents exist, suppose that ￿ = 3
8 and let u 2 Fn
such that p(u1) = p(u2) = 0, and u3 such that ￿(u3) = [1
2; 3
4] and u3(0) > u3(1).
Then, f(u) = 3
8 ￿ "(u3). Let v3 such that ￿(v3) = [1
2; 3
4] and v3(0) < v3(1).
Then, f(v3;u￿3) = 3
8 +"(u3). Observe that agent 3 manipulates f at u via v3.9
9This example can be easily adapted and de￿ned for single-peaked preferences. The same
conditions hold and are violated, and similar pro￿les work to show manipulation by single
agents. Note that non-bossiness does not hold either: Let u 2 Sn such that p(u1) = p(u2) = 0,
and u3 such that p(u3) = 1
2 and u3(0) > u3(1):Then, f(u) = 3
8 ￿ "(u3). Let v3 such that
p(v3) = 5
8 and v3(0) < v3(1). Then, f(v3;u￿3) = 3
8 + "(u3). Note that we can impose that
and ru3(￿ ￿ "(u3)) = ￿ + "(v3). Then, non-bossiness is violated.
8By means of these two previous examples, we can also show that neither
weak Maskin monotonicity implies plateau-invariance nor the converse on Fn.
The idea is that while weak Maskin monotonicity requires a strict improvement
for all alternatives in the range, plateau-invariance alternatively requires an
improvement but only for some subset of alternatives in the range.
3 Main Results
Along the paper we are interested in establishing the relationship between
strategy-proofness, Maskin monotonicity and non-bossiness, and the variations
of them de￿ned in Section 1: quasi non-bossiness, weak non-bossiness, weak
Maskin monotonicity and plateau-invariance. In particular, we ask whether
there are relationships between them and whether these relationships rely on
the preference domains under study (F or S). We ￿rst consider the single-
peaked domain and then we analyze the single-plateaued one.
3.1 Single-peaked preferences
For the case of single-peaked preferences, there exist lots of rules simultaneously
satisfying our three main strategic requirements. See the following very well-
known example.
Example 3 Let n ￿ 3 be odd. Then, for any u 2 Sn, de￿ne the social choice
function f as follows:
f(u) = medfp(u1);:::;p(un)g.
The median voter rule is strategy-proof (see Moulin, 1980). It is easy to check
that f also satis￿es non-bossiness and Maskin monotonicity.
First observe that although there exist rules satisfying all the properties, any
couple of them may be logically independent. What we do in this subsection
is to obtain for Sn the exact relationship between our three basic strategic
requirements.
By means of Examples 4 and 5 below, observe that for social choice functions
on Sn neither strategy-proofness nor Maskin monotonicity alone imply non-
bossiness, nor the converse. However, non-bossiness turns out to be crucial as
a complement to strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences.
Example 4 Let a;b 2 A, a < b, and n ￿ 2. Then, for any u 2 Sn, de￿ne the
social choice function f as follows:
f(u) =
￿
a if #fi 2 N : ui(a) > ui(b)g ￿ #fi 2 N : ui(a) < ui(b)g, and
b otherwise.
Observe that f is strategy-proof and it satis￿es Maskin monotonicity. However
it is not non-bossy. Suppose that n is odd (a similar example could be obtained
9for n even). Let u 2 Sn be such that for n￿1
2 agents (say, set S0), p(uj) = 0,
for n￿1
2 agents p(uj) = 1 (say, set S1), and for the last agent (say, agent 1)
u1(a) = u1(b). Let v1 2 S be such that p(v1) = b. Then, f(u) = a and
f(v1;u￿1) = b. Note that u1(f(u)) = u1(f(v1;u￿1)) but f(u) 6= f(v1;u￿1).
Using the same preferences we can show that f violates quasi non-bossiness.
Example 5 Let a;b 2 A, a 6= 0, a < b, and n ￿ 2. Then, for any u 2 Sn,





a if u1(a) > u1(b), u1(0) 6= u1(b), and u1(0) 6= u1(a),
b if u1(b) > u1(a), u1(0) 6= u1(b), and u1(0) 6= u1(a), and
0 if u1(a) = u1(b), or u1(0) = u1(b), or u1(0) = u1(a).
Note that f is non-bossy however it is manipulable and it does not satisfy Maskin
monotonicity. To show that strategy-proofness fails, consider u1;v1 2 S such
that u1(a) = u1(b) (thus p(u1) 2 (a;b)) and p(v1) 2 (a;b), v1(a) > v1(0) >
v1(b). Then, f(u) = 0 and f(v1;u￿2) = a and agent 1 would manipulate f
at u via v1. Note also that L(f(u);u1) = f0g [ [ru1(0);1] which is a subset of
L(f(u);v1) = f0g[[rv1(0);1] since rv1(0) < ru1(0). Thus, Maskin monotonicity
does not hold.
Note that the range of the social choice functions in the previous examples
is not convex. That the range of a social choice function be a closed interval has
happened to be quite important in the characterization of strategy-proof social
choice functions on the single-peaked domain (see Moulin, 1980, Ching, 1998,
and Sprumont, 1995). From the above examples, one could think that there
should be a close relationship between convexity of the range and non-bossiness
under strategy-proofness. In fact, as shown in Theorem 1, under strategy-
proofness, convexity of the range and non-bossiness are equivalent. The next
theorem however tells us much more.
Let us ￿rst de￿ne the relevant and well-known class of minmax rules for
which we present an alternative characterization result.
De￿nition 9 A social choice function f is a minmax rule if there exist a list
of parameters (aS)S￿N 2 A2
n
satisfying that for any S;T ￿ N, S ￿ T, then









The class of minmax rules is equivalent to the class of augmented median
voter rules due to Ching (1998) and the class of generalized median voter
schemes de￿ned for one good as in Barber￿, Gul, and Stachetti (1993).
Theorem 1 Let f be a strategy-proof social choice function on Sn. Then the
following statements are equivalent:
(i) f is non-bossy,
(ii) f is quasi non-bossy,
(iii) f is a minmax rule,
(iv) f has a convex range.
10To illustrate the relevance of the result in Theorem 1, observe ￿rst (as illus-
trated in Example 4) that strategy-proofness implies neither non-bossiness, nor
quasi non-bossiness, nor convexity of the range. Second, note that at the light
of Theorem 2.4 in Sprumont (1995) (which uses Ching￿ s characterization result
and convexity of the range), we can establish the characterization result of the
well-known class of minmax rules using non-bossiness (or equivalently, quasi
non-bossiness) instead of other well-known requirements such as peak-onlyness
(used in Moulin, 1980).
Alternatively, on Sn and under strategy-proofness, quasi non-bossiness, non-
bossiness, and also convexity of the range are equivalent. Moreover, the class of
minmax rules are the only strategy-proof rules with convex range.
It is worth mentioning that the result in Theorem 1 does not hold relaxing
non-bossiness with weak non-bossiness. Observe that the rule de￿ned in Exam-
ple 4 satis￿es weak non-bossiness and strategy-proofness but it does not have a
convex range.
A natural question that arises is if strategy-proofness can be replaced by
Maskin monotonicity in Theorem 1. To answer this question let us ￿rst analyze
the relationship between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity for social
choice functions on Sn.
We will show below that Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness
but the converse does not hold. As it is illustrated by means of Example 4,
there exist social choice functions on Sn that are strategy-proof and weakly
non-bossy (the latter is straightforward by de￿nition), that additionally satisfy
Maskin monotonicity. As we show in the following statement, the relation-
ship between strategy-proofness joint with weak non-bossiness with respect to
Maskin monotonicity stated in the social choice function presented in Example
4 is not a particular feature of that rule.
Theorem 2 A social choice function f on Sn is strategy-proof and weakly non-
bossy if and only if f is Maskin monotonic.
Among the previous literature, other papers have also established the rela-
tionship between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness. We now discuss
some of them in order to clarify the relevance of the previous result. The clas-
sical result by Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) asserts that on the unrestricted
strict preference domain, a social choice function is strategy-proof if and only
if it is Maskin monotonic (also called in the literature strong positive associa-
tion). Barber￿ and Peleg (1990) in the framework with a metric space as set
of alternatives and preferences being continuous utility functions showed that
strategy-proofness does not imply Maskin monotonicity. However, a weaker
version of it, which they call modi￿ed strong positive association, is necessary
though not su¢ cient for strategy-proofness (see their Lemma 4.8). Another
existing result goes in the other direction. That is, strategy-proofness is a nec-
essary condition for Maskin monotonicity. Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin
(1979) considered a general set of alternatives and "rich" domains and they
obtain strategy-proofness as a necessary condition for Maskin monotonicity.
11In our framework, by Theorem 2 above, on Sn Maskin monotonicity implies
strategy-proofness. However, the converse does not hold as Example 7 below
illustrates. With single-peaked preferences, Maskin monotonicity and strategy-
proofness are equivalent under weak non-bossiness. Note that to show the re-
lationship between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity in Theorem 2
we can not use the results stated in Takamiya (2007) and in Bochet and Klaus
(2008). The authors consider frameworks encompassing ours and de￿ne two
su¢ cient conditions that a domain of a social choice function should satisfy to
have the property that strategy-proofness (in fact, coalition strategy-proofness
in Takamiya, 2007) implies Maskin monotonicity and its converse. However,
one can check that the domain of single-peaked preferences satis￿es neither
Takamiya￿ s condition A nor condition B. Concerning Bochet and Klaus (2008),
the domain of single-peaked preferences satis￿es only their condition R1 that
assures that Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness. Independently of
their result, we also establish such relationship as part of our Theorem 2.
It is also interesting to observe that the result in Theorem 2 is tight. Or
equivalently, as we show in the following examples, strategy-proofness and weak
non-bossiness are also independent properties of social choice functions in our
framework.
Example 6 Let a 2 A and n ￿ 2. Then, for any u 2 Sn de￿ne f as follows:
f(u) = ru1(a).
Observe that f is weakly non-bossy, but it is not strategy-proof. Suppose, without
loss of generality, that a = 1
2. Let u1 2 S be such that ru1(1
2) = 1
4 and v1 2 S be
such that rv1(1
2) = 1
3. Let u￿1 2 Sn￿1. Therefore, f(u) = 1
4 and f(v1;u￿1) = 1
3.
Note that u1(f(v1;u￿1)) > u1(f(u)).
It is worth noting that f violates quasi non-bossiness.10 Let i = 1, u1 2 S as
above and w1 2 S such that p(w1) = 1
2: By de￿nition of f, for any w￿1 2 Sn￿1;
f(u1;w￿1) = 1
4 which di⁄ers from f(w1;w￿1) = 1
2; however, u1(f(u1;w￿1)) =
u1(f(w1;w￿1)):




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
a if #fi 2 N : ui(a) > ui(b)g > #fi 2 N : ui(a) < ui(b)g,
b if #fi 2 N : ui(a) > ui(b)g < #fi 2 N : ui(a) < ui(b)g,
a if #fi 2 N : ui(a) > ui(b)g = #fi 2 N : ui(a) < ui(b)g > 0, or
if 8i 2 N, ui(a) = ui(b) and
#
￿










Observe that f is strategy-proof. However it is not weakly non-bossy. Suppose
that n is odd (a similar example could be obtained for n even). Let u 2 Sn
be such that for any agent i 2 N, ui(a) = ui(b), p(u1) < a+b
2 , p(uj) = a+b
2
10We thank a referee for noting this point.
12for j 2 S0 ￿ Nnf1g, being S0 a set of n￿1
2 agents, and p(uk) > a+b
2 for
k 2 S1 = Nn(S0 [ f1g) being S1 a set of n￿1
2 agents. Consider also v1 2 S such
that v1(a) = v1(b) but p(v1) > a+b
2 . Therefore, f(u) = a and f(v1;u￿1) = b.
Note that u1(f(u)) = u1(f(v1;u￿1)) and v1(f(v1;u￿1)) = v1(f(u)) but f(u) 6=
f(v1;u￿1) which means that weakly non-bossy is violated. The same pro￿les
show that f violates Maskin monotonicity. Note that L(u1;f(u)) = L(v1;f(u))
but f(u) 6= f(v1;u￿1).
Before going to the next subsection where the relationships between our
strategic requirements for Fn are studied, note that Theorem 2 allows us to state
that strategy-proofness can be replaced by Maskin monotonicity in Theorem 1.
3.2 Single-plateaued preferences
The statement we did for single-peakedness about "the existence of lots of rules
simultaneously satisfying our three main strategic requirements" is completely
false for the case of single-plateaued preferences. Although we can obtain lots of
examples of strategy-proof rules (see Berga, 1998) it is impossible to ￿nd non-
constant social choice functions satisfying either one of the other two strategic
requirements: non-bossiness or Maskin monotonicity. Furthermore, it is also
impossible to match strategy-proofness and quasi non-bossiness unless we get
constant rules. Such kind of impossibility results are embedded in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 There is no social choice function f on Fn with #Af > 2 if
one of the following statements holds:
(i) f is non-bossy,
(ii) f is Maskin monotonic,
(iii) f is strategy-proof and quasi non-bossy.
Note that Proposition 1 excludes dictatorial social choice functions, in par-
ticular, only constant social choice functions are compatible with either Maskin
monotonicity, or non-bossiness, or else strategy-proofness joint with quasi non-
bossiness. The result in part (ii) can be also obtained as a corollary to Saijo
(1987)￿ s Theorem. In that paper, Saijo analyzes the relationship between Maskin
monotonicity and the constancy of a rule in a more general framework that
encompasses ours. In particular, he uses a condition on Af called "dual domi-
nance" that any social choice function must satisfy to guarantee that the only
Maskin monotonic rules are constant ones.11 The proof of part (ii) of Proposi-
tion 1 is essentially identical to Saijo￿ s one. We incorporate it in the Appendix
for sake of completeness. A similar conclusion is obtained in Bochet and Klaus
(2008).
11In his general framework, A is any set of social alternatives and for any i 2 N, Ei is the
set of agent i0s preferences, where Ei is any subset of complete and transitive binary relations
on A (that is, weak orderings). We can obtain our framework de￿ning A = [0;1], and for any
i 2 N, Ei = F. Note also that it is easy to see that any social choice function on Fn over A
satis￿es "dual dominance". See his Example 1.
13Note that, like for Sn, weak non-bossiness is strictly weaker than non-
bossiness under strategy-proofness with single-plateaued preferences. By Propo-
sition 1 above, only constant rules are non-bossy while there exist non-constant
rules satisfying strategy-proofness and weak non-bossiness, for instance the rule
presented in Example 1.
Concerning the relationship between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonic-
ity, again, observe on the one hand that Muller and Satterthwaite (1977)￿ s equiv-
alence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness does not hold for
Fn (there exist lots of non-constant strategy-proof rules on Fn while only con-
stant ones are Maskin monotonic). On the other hand, note that we can not use
the results stated in Takamiya (2007) and in Bochet and Klaus (2008). We can
check that the domain of single-plateaued preferences satis￿es only condition B
(not condition A) in Takamiya￿ s Theorem 2 and only condition R1 (not condi-
tion R2) in Bochet and Klaus￿Theorem 1 to establish that Maskin monotonicity
implies strategy-proofness. Thus, by statement (ii) in Proposition 1 above, the
results stated in Theorem 2 in Takamiya (2007) and in Theorem 1 in Bochet
and Klaus (2008) are completely vacuous and trivially satis￿ed when applied to
single-plateaued preferences.
Given the impossibility results in Proposition 1 if we are interested in es-
tablishing a relationship between strategy-proofness, a kind of ￿ la non-bossy
condition, and/or a kind of ￿ la Maskin monotonicity condition, we should con-
centrate on weaker versions of them. Concretely, we use weak non-bossiness and
weak Maskin monotonicity or plateau-invariance, respectively.
Below we state the counterpart result to Theorem 2 for the single-plateaued
domain.
Theorem 3 A social choice function f on Fn is strategy-proof and weakly non-
bossy if and only if f is weakly Maskin monotonic.
By Proposition 1, we can not replace weak Maskin monotonicity by Maskin
monotonicity in Theorem 3: the rule in Example 1 is strategy-proof, weakly non-
bossy but it is not constant. Moreover, note that the result stated in Theorem 3
is tight. See Example 2 and replicate Example 7 above for single-plateaued pref-
erences to show the independence of strategy-proofness and weak non-bossiness.
Now we are interested in studying the power that plateau-invariance joint
with strategy-proofness give to social choice functions on Fn. As we see by
means of the following result, these two conditions imply weak non-bossiness,
weak Maskin monotonicity, and also convexity of the range. Plateau-invariance
is very powerful. It allows us to state clear relationships between strategy-
proofness and both the weaker versions of non-bossiness and weak Maskin
monotonicity.
Proposition 2 Let f be a strategy-proof and plateau-invariant social choice
function on Fn. Then, (i) f is weakly non-bossy, (ii) f is weakly Maskin
monotonic, and (iii) f has a convex range.
14Note that the converse of these three results do not hold. Concretely, ob-
serve ￿rst that we can not adapt Theorem 1 for single-plateaued preferences
using weak non-bossiness (see the Concluding Remarks section). However, one
could think that plateau-invariance would help to obtain that counterpart re-
sult; that is, that under strategy-proofness, plateau-invariance and convex range
are equivalent. Note that Proposition 2 tells us that this is not true either and
Example 1 above presents a strategy-proof rule on Fn with convex range but
violating plateau-invariance.
Second, observe that under strategy-proofness, plateau-invariance is equiva-
lent to neither weak non-bossiness nor to weak Maskin monotonicity. Example
8 presents a strategy-proof and weakly non-bossy, and thus, weakly Maskin
monotonic social choice function that violates plateau-invariance.




a if u1(a) > u1(b), and
b otherwise.
Observe that f is strategy-proof and weakly non-bossy (thus, weakly Maskin
monotonic). However the range is not convex. Observe also that f is not
plateau-invariant. Let u1 2 F be such that p￿(u1) > a and p+(u1) = b and
v1 2 F be such that ￿(v1) = [a;b]. Let u￿1 2 Fn￿1. Therefore, f(u) = b and
f(v1;u￿1) = a, which contradicts part (1) in the de￿nition of plateau-invariance.
4 Concluding Remarks
To conclude we ￿rst summarize our main results and mention some questions
for further research. In the framework of the provision of a single pure pub-
lic good with single-peaked or single-plateaued preferences, we establish the
equivalence between strategy-proofness joint with weak non-bossiness and weak
Maskin monotonicity (see Theorems 2 and 3). For single-peakedness, we can
go further and we obtain the well-known class of minmax rules as the unique
strategy-proof rules satisfying non-bossiness (see Theorem 1). We also show
that strategy-proofness can be replaced by Maskin monotonicity. For single-
plateaued preferences, we obtain constant rules as the unique ones satisfying ei-
ther Maskin monotonicity, or non-bossiness, or else strategy-proofness and quasi
non-bossiness (see Proposition 1). We also identify a condition called plateau-
invariance that joint with strategy-proofness guarantees convexity of the range
(see Proposition 2). Note that the unique result valid for both domains is the
one in Theorem 3.12 Note also that all our proofs can be adequately adapted to
show that our results, except the one related to the characterization in part (iii)
of Theorem 1, hold whenever we consider weakly single-peaked or else weakly
12See Berga and Moreno (2007), the previous version of this paper, for a detailed analysis
showing that the other relationships established in the paper hold only for one of our two
domains.
15single-plateaued preferences.13 Roughly speaking, weakly refers to allowing for
indi⁄erence in the same side of the peak or the plateau. Cantala (2004) analyzes
the particular subclass of weakly single-peaked preferences where one plateau
at the lowest feasible level of utility is considered in both sides of the peak. He
obtains the extreme minmax rules (a subclass of minmax rules whose outcome
is always an agent￿ s peak) as the unique strategy-proof and e¢ cient rules. Note
that with weakly single-peaked preferences, the class of strategy-proof rules with
convex range (since we can show peak-onlyness) could be a strict subset of the
class of minmax rules, not necessarily all.
Given the results in Theorems 1 and 2, a natural further research work
is to obtain the characterization class of all strategy-proof and weakly non-
bossy rules on Sn. As Theorem 1 indicates the relaxation from non-bossy to
weakly non-bossy includes rules with non-convex range as part of the expected
characterization class. We already know that the class of strategy-proof and
weakly non-bossy rules must be a subclass of Barber￿ and Jackson (1994)￿ s
rules.
As we have seen, non-bossiness turns out to be crucial in the characteriza-
tion of strategy-proof rules with convex range for single-peakedness. Note also
that on single-peaked preferences there does not exist a closed characterization
of strategy-proof rules with non convex range. Barber￿ and Jackson (1994)
obtain a characterization via a class of tie-breaking rules. However, neither in
the single-peaked nor in the single-plateaued preferences domain, weak non-
bossiness guarantees convex range. As we show in part (iii) of Proposition 2,
strategy-proofness joint with plateau-invariance assures convexity of the range
for single-plateuedness. Thus, one can think that plateau-invariance opens a
possibility to obtain a closed characterization result in the line of those obtained
for single-peakedness but for the case of plateaux.
Finally, we present some implementation results straightforwardly obtained
combining the results in our paper with the ones in Saijo, Sj￿strom, and Yamato
(2007). These authors state that (i) a social choice function is dominant strat-
egy implemented by its associated direct mechanism if and only if it satis￿es
strategy-proofness and quasi non-bossiness, (ii) a social choice function is se-
curely implementable if and only if it satis￿es strategy-proofness, non-bossiness,
and the outcome rectangular property. These results together with the results
of our paper provide the following:
￿ An alternative characterization of minmax rules for single-peakedness: "A
social choice function on the single-peaked domain is dominant strategy im-
plemented by its associated direct revelation mechanism if and only if it is a
minmax rule.".
￿ A social choice function on the single-plateaued domain is securely imple-
mentable if and only if it is constant.
13Formally, a preference ui is weakly single-plateaued if there exist p￿(ui), p+(ui) 2 A,
p￿(ui) 6 p+(ui) such that [p￿(ui);p+(ui)] = fx 2 A : ui(x) > ui(y); for all y 2 Ag, and for
any y;z 2 A such that y < z 6 p￿(ui), or p+(ui) ￿ z < y, then ui(z) ￿ ui(y). We say that ui
is weakly single-peaked if it is a weakly single-plateaued preference such that [p￿(ui);p+(ui)]
is degenerated to a single point, the peak.
16￿ A social choice function on the single-plateaued domain is dominant strategy
implemented by its associated direct revelation mechanism (or alternatively,
Nash implementable) if and only if it is constant.
Saijo, Sj￿strom, and Yamato (2007) also show that if a social choice function
on the single-peaked domain is securely implementable, then there is a dictator
on the range of the social choice function.
The kind of indi⁄erences existing in both domains is the reason why we ob-
tain such di⁄erences between the two domains concerning the existence of non-
constant rules and either securely, or Nash implementable, or dominant strategy
implementable via its direct revelation mechanism. Under single-peakedness,
indi⁄erence classes may consist of at most two alternatives. In the case of
single-plateaued preferences, the set of best alternatives contains more than one
alternative. Yet, weakening the notion of single peakedness to allow for indif-
ferences, even in the set of best alternatives, is a delicate matter because it may
destroy all regularities. In particular, in our framework there exist non-constant
rules that are either non-bossy or Maskin monotonic on the single-peaked do-
main while only constant rules are either non-bossy or Maskin monotonic for
the single-plateaued one.
5 Proofs
We devote this section to the proofs of all results. We start showing the equiv-
alence between weak Maskin and Maskin monotonicity for single-peaked pref-
erences.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let f be a weakly Maskin monotonic social choice
function on Sn. Let u 2 Sn and vi 2 S such that L(f(u);ui) ￿ L(f(u);vi) (say,
condition B). To show that Maskin monotonicity holds, we must obtain that
f(vi;u￿i) = f(u). Without loss of generality, suppose that p(ui) ￿ f(u). Note
that on Sn, this fact joint with condition B imply that p(vi) 2 [f(u);rui(f(u))]
and rvi(f(u)) ￿ rui(f(u)). Thus, it is trivial to see that the following two
conditions hold: (i) for any x 2 A such that ui(f(u)) = ui(x) then it also holds
that vi(f(u)) ￿ vi(x) and (ii) for any x 2 A such that ui(f(u)) > ui(x) then it
also holds that vi(f(u)) > vi(x). Thus, conditions of weak Maskin monotonicity
holds and thus f(vi;u￿i) = f(u) which ends the proof.
Let us now prove the main results, all presented in Section 3. First, we show
Theorem 1, that is, the equivalence of non-bossiness, convex range, and quasi
non-bossiness under strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences. We need
the de￿nition of uncompromisingness ￿rst introduced by Border and Jordan
(1983).
De￿nition 10 We say that f satis￿es uncompromisingness if the following
holds: Pick any u 2 Dn and set f(u) = z. For all j 2 N and all vj 2 D, we
have f(vj;u￿j) = f(u) if either z < p￿(uj) and z ￿ p￿(vj), or else z > p+(uj)
and z ￿ p+(vj).
17To show the equivalence between quasi non-bossiness and convex range for
single-peaked preferences we need the following intermediate result that also
holds for single-plateaued preferences. It says that strategy-proofness and quasi
non-bossiness impose some additional property on f (say, Property L) which is,
in fact, stronger than Maskin monotonicity by de￿nition.
Lemma 2 If a social choice function f on Dn is strategy-proof and quasi non-
bossy then the following property (say, Property L) holds:
"For all ui;vi 2 D such that L(x;ui) ￿ L(x;vi) for all x 2 Af we have that
f(u) = f(vi;u￿i) for all u￿i 2 Dn￿1".
Proof of Lemma 2. Let f be a strategy-proof and quasi non-bossy social
choice function. Let ui;vi 2 D be such that L(x;ui) ￿ L(x;vi) for all x 2 Af.
Note that by strategy-proofness, ui(f(u)) > ui(f(vi;u￿i)) and vi(f(vi;u￿i)) >
vi(f(u)) for all u￿i 2 Dn￿1. Since L(x;ui) ￿ L(x;vi) for all x 2 Af, we
have that L(f(u);ui) ￿ L(f(u);vi), and therefore ui(f(u)) > ui(f(vi;u￿i))
implies that vi(f(u)) > vi(f(vi;u￿i)). Then vi(f(u)) = vi(f(vi;u￿i)) for all
u￿i 2 Dn￿1. By quasi non-bossiness, we have that f(u) = f(vi;u￿i) for all
u￿i 2 Dn￿1.
Proof of Theorem 1.
We proceed showing the two following if and only if relationships: (i) f is
non-bossy() (iv) f has convex range and (ii) f is quasi non-bossy () (iv) f
has convex range. Note that the relationship (iii) f is a minmax rule () (iv)
f has convex range, has been already stated in the literature (see Theorem 2.4
in Sprumont, 1995).
(i) () (iv) Let f be a strategy-proof social choice function on Sn. We ￿rst
show that if f is non-bossy then it has convex range. By contradiction suppose
that there exist x;y 2 Af, x < y, such that (x;y) ￿ AnAf. Let u;v 2 Sn such
that f(u) = x and f(v) = y. Let wi 2 S be such that p(wi) 2 (f(u);f(v)) and
wi(f(u)) = wi(f(v)). Under u we distinguish three type of agents, N1 = fi 2 N
such that ui(f(u)) = ui(f(v))g, N2 = fj 2 N such that uj(f(u)) > uj(f(v))g
and N3 = fk 2 N such that uk(f(v)) > uk(f(u))g. We distinguish three cases:
Case 1. If any i 2 N1 announces wi, by non-bossiness f(wi;u￿i) = f(u). There-
fore, f(wN1;uN2;uN3) = f(u).
Case 2. If any j 2 N2 announces wj, f(wN1;wj;uN2nfjg;uN3) 2 ff(u);f(v)g by
strategy-proofness. Suppose to get a contradiction that f(wN1;wj;uN2nfjg;uN3)=
f(v). By non-bossiness, f(wN1;uN2;uN3)= f(wN1;wj;uN2nfjg;uN3)= f(v),
contradicting that f(u) 6= f(v). Therefore f(wN1;wj;uN2nfjg;uN3) = f(u),
and f(wN1;wN2;uN3) = f(u).
Case 3. If any k 2 N3 announces wk, by strategy-proofness at (wN1;wN2;wk;uN3nfkg),
f(wN1;wN2;wk;uN3nfkg) 2 ff(u);f(v)g. Suppose to get a contradiction that
f(wN1;wN2;wk;uN3nfkg) = f(v). By non-bossiness, we obtain that f(wN1;wN2;uN3)
= f(wN1;wN2;wk;uN3nfkg) = f(v), contradicting that f(u) 6= f(v). Therefore
f(wN1;wN2;wk;uN3nfkg) = f(u) and f(wN1;wN2;wN3) = f(w) = f(u). Begin-
ning from v, and from a similar argument than before we get that f(w) = f(v)
and we get the desired contradiction.
18We now show that if f has convex range then it is non-bossy. By contra-
diction suppose that there exist i, ui, vi 2 S and u￿i 2 Sn￿1 such that
f(u) 6= f(vi;u￿i), and ui(f(u)) = ui(f(vi;u￿i)). Suppose without loss of gen-
erality that f(u) < f(vi;u￿i). Observe ￿rst that f(u) and f(vi;u￿i) are di⁄er-
ent from p(ui). By single-peakedness, p(ui) 2 (f(u);f(vi;u￿i)). By strategy-
proofness, p(vi) > f(u). By Lemma 2.1 in Sprumont (1995), we have that f
is peak-only. Then, his Fact 2 and peak-onlyness imply uncompromisingness
of f. Thus, it is straightforward to show that f(vi;u￿i) = f(u) and we get a
contradiction.
(ii) () (iv) Let f be a strategy proof and quasi non-bossy social choice func-
tion. By contradiction, suppose that Af is not convex. Then, there exist
a;b 2 Af, a < b, such that (a;b) ￿ AnAf. Let vi 2 S be such that p(vi) 2 (a;b)
and vi(a) = vi(b), ui 2 S be such that p(ui) = a and L(x;ui) ￿ L(x;vi) for
all x 2 Af, and wi 2 S be such that p(wi) = b and L(x;wi) ￿ L(x;vi) for
all x 2 Af. Since f is strategy proof, we have that it is unanimous on the
range. Therefore, f(u1;u2;::;un) = a, and f(w1;w2;::;wn) = b. Beginning
from u and changing one individual each time we have from Lemma 2 that
f(v1;v2;::;vn) = a. Beginning from w and changing one individual each time
we have from Lemma 2 that f(v1;v2;::;vn) = b. We get a contradiction with f
being a social choice function.
The converse, that is, that any strategy-proof rule with convex range is quasi
non-bossy, is straightforward by the implication (iv) ) (i) shown above. If f is
strategy-proof and has convex range is non-bossy and thus quasi non-bossy (by
de￿nition).
Second, we show that Maskin monotonicity is strictly stronger than strategy-
proofness on Sn. Moreover, they are equivalent adding weak non-bossiness.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let ￿rst show that any Maskin monotonic social
choice function f on Sn is strategy-proof and weakly non-bossy. Suppose ￿rst
that f is not weakly non-bossy. Then there exist ui;vi 2 S, and u￿i 2 Sn￿1,
such that ui(f(u)) = ui(f(vi;u￿i)) and vi(f(u)) = vi(f(vi;u￿i)) but f(u) 6=
f(vi;u￿i). Suppose, without loss of generality, that f(u) < f(vi;u￿i). By
single-peakedness, p(ui), p(vi) 2 (f(u);f(vi;u￿i)). Therefore, L(f(u);ui) ￿
L(f(u);vi), and by Maskin monotonicity f(u) = f(vi;u￿i), which is a contra-
diction.
Suppose now that f is not strategy-proof. Then there exist i 2 N, ui;vi 2 S,
and u￿i 2 Sn￿1, such that ui(f(vi;u￿i)) > ui(f(u)). Thus, f(vi;u￿i) 6= f(u).
Suppose, without loss of generality, that p(ui) < f(u). By single-peakedness,
f(vi;u￿i) 2 (rui(f(u));f(u)). Let wi 2 S be such that p(wi) = f(vi;u￿i)
and L(f(u);ui) ￿ L(f(u);wi). By Maskin monotonicity, f(wi;u￿i) = f(u).
Since L(f(vi;u￿i);vi) ￿ L(f(vi;u￿i);wi) = A, again by Maskin monotonicity
f(wi;u￿i) = f(vi;u￿i) and we get a contradiction to the fact that f(vi;u￿i) 6=
f(u).
Now, we show that any strategy-proof and weakly non-bossy social choice func-
tion is Maskin monotonic. Suppose not. Then there exist u 2 Sn, i 2 N,
and vi 2 S such that L(f(u);ui) ￿ L(f(u);vi) (say condition B) but f(u) 6=
19f(vi;u￿i). Without loss of generality, let f(u) < f(vi;u￿i). By strategy-
proofness, ui(f(u)) > ui(f(vi;u￿i)).
Note that if f(u) = p(ui) condition B implies that p(vi) = f(u). By strategy-
proofness, f(vi;u￿i) = f(u) which is the desired contradiction.
Now suppose that f(u) > p(ui). By strategy-proofness, ui(f(u)) > ui(f(vi;u￿i)).
Then f(vi;u￿i) = 2 (rui(f(u));f(u)]. In order that condition B holds, rvi(f(u)) ￿
rui(f(u)) and p(vi) ￿ f(u). This contradicts strategy-proofness since vi(f(u)) >
vi(f(vi;u￿i)).
Finally let f(u) < p(ui). By strategy-proofness, f(vi;u￿i) > p(ui) and rui(f(u)) ￿
f(vi;u￿i) (say I1). In order that condition B holds, rvi(f(u)) ￿ rui(f(u)) (say
I2) and thus p(vi) < rui(f(u)). If one of the two inequalities (I1) and (I2) hold
strictly, that is, if either rui(f(u)) < f(vi;u￿i) or else rvi(f(u)) < rui(f(u)),
then we get a contradiction to strategy-proofness since we have that rvi(f(u)) <
f(vi;u￿i). Otherwise, if rvi(f(u)) = rui(f(u)) = f(vi;u￿i), by weak non-
bossiness we obtain that f(vi;u￿i) = f(u) which is the desired contradiction.
Previously to the proof of Proposition 1, we need to introduce the well-known
notion of an option set and an intermediate result stated in Claim 1 below.
De￿nition 11 Let f be a social choice function on Dn. The option set of
coalition S at uNnS is the set
o(uNnS) = fx 2 A
￿
￿there exists uS 2 Ds such that f(uS;uNnS) = xg:
Claim 1 Let f be a non-bossy social choice function on Fn with #Af ￿ 2.
Then, (i) o(u￿i) is a singleton for any i 2 N and u￿i 2 Fn￿1. Moreover, (ii)
o(ui) is also a singleton for any i 2 N and ui 2 F.
Proof of Claim 1. Let f be a non-bossy social choice function on Fn with
#Af ￿ 2. First, we show part (i) by contradiction. Consider i 2 N and
u￿i 2 Fn￿1 ￿xed. By contradiction, suppose that o(u￿i) is not a singleton. Let
ui, vi 2 F such that f(ui;u￿i) = x and f(vi;u￿i) = y where x 6= y. Let !i 2 F
such that ￿(!i) = A. By non-bossiness, f(!i;u￿i) = x and f(!i;u￿i) = y
which is the desired contradiction.
To show part (ii), let i 2 N, ui 2 F, and y 2 o(ui). Let u￿i 2 Fn￿1 such that
f(ui;u￿i) = y. Consider any v￿i 2 Fn￿1. We must show that f(ui;v￿i) = y.
We will do it changing one by one agents￿preferences from u￿i to v￿i and
applying n￿1 times part (i) of this claim. Let j 6= i, u￿j 2 Fn￿1, by part (i) of
this claim, f(vj;u￿j) = y. Let k 6= fi;jg and let u￿k = (vj;u￿fk;jg). Applying
part (i) again we obtain that f(vj;vk;u￿fj;kg) = y. Repeating this argument
we get that f(ui;v￿i) = y.
Claim 1 is crucial in the proof of part (i) in Proposition 1, that is, to show
the inexistence of non-bossy rules on Fn apart from constant ones. Next we
show that any rule on the single-plateaued domain with #Af ￿ 2 is bossy, it
violates Maskin monotonicity, and furthermore, constant rules are the only ones
satisfying both strategy-proofness and quasi non-bossiness on Fn.
20Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Let f be a non-bossy social choice function
on Fn with #Af ￿ 2. Note that by de￿nition of f as a social choice function,
given u 2 Fn, f(u) =
T
i2N [o(ui) \ o(u￿i)]. By Claim 1, both kinds of option
sets are singletons. Thus, in order that f be well-de￿ned, given u 2 Fn, f(u) =
o(ui) = o(u￿i) for any i 2 N. This means that f is a constant function, i.e.
for any u 2 Fn, f(u) = x 2 A (otherwise, if x = f(u) = o(ui) = o(u￿i)
and y = f(v) = o(vi) = o(v￿i), x 6= y, then f(vi;u￿i) = o(vi) = x and
f(vi;u￿i) = o(u￿i) = y which is the desired contradiction).
(ii) Let f be a Maskin monotonic social choice function on Fn with #Af ￿ 2.
Let Af ￿ fx;yg, where x 6= y. Let u;v 2 Fn be such that f(u) = x and f(v) =
y. Without loss of generality suppose that x < y. Let w 2 Fn, be such that for
all i 2 N, ￿(wi) = [x;y]. Since f is Maskin monotonic, f(wi;u￿i) = f(u) since
L(x;ui) ￿ L(x;wi) = A for any i 2 N. Repeating the same argument for any
agent i 2 N; we obtain that f(w) = f(u). Similarly, f(w) = f(v). This implies
that x = y, a contradiction.
(iii) It is straightforward by part (ii), Lemma 2 above and the fact that Property
L implies Maskin monotonicity, as previously noted.
We now show that counterpart result of Theorem 2 for Fn. Concretely, on
Fn, strategy-proofness and weak non-bossiness are equivalent to weak Maskin
monotonicity.
Proof of Theorem 3. We ￿rst show that any strategy-proof and weakly
non-bossy social choice function on Fn is weakly Maskin monotonic. Let i 2 N,
ui;vi 2 F, and u￿i 2 Fn￿1 be such that for all x 2 A, such that ui(f(u)) =
ui(x) we have that vi(f(u)) > vi(x) and ui(f(u)) > ui(x) we have that vi(f(u)) >
vi(x). By strategy-proofness, ui(f(u)) > ui(f(vi;u￿i)) and by the condition in
weak Maskin monotonicity letting x = f(vi;u￿i), we have that vi(f(u)) >
vi(f(vi;u￿i)). Again, by strategy-proofness vi(f(vi;u￿i)) > vi(f(u)). There-
fore, vi(f(vi;u￿i)) = vi(f(u)) and ui(f(u)) = ui(f(vi;u￿i)) (if ui(f(u)) >
ui(f(vi;u￿i)) we would have vi(f(u)) > vi(f(vi;u￿i)) and i would manipulate
f at (vi;u￿i) via ui). By weak non-bossiness, f(u) = f(vi;u￿i).
We now show that if f is weakly Maskin monotonic then it is weakly non-bossy
and strategy-proof. To show weak non-bossiness, consider i 2 N, ui, vi 2 F, and
u￿i 2 Fn￿1 such that vi(f(vi;u￿i)) = vi(f(u)) and ui(f(u)) = ui(f(vi;u￿i)).
If for any x 2 A, ui(f(u)) = ui(x) implies vi(f(u)) ￿ vi(x) and ui(f(u)) > ui(x)
implies vi(f(u)) > vi(x) or else for any x 2 A, vi(f(u)) = vi(x) implies
ui(f(u)) ￿ ui(x) and vi(f(u)) > vi(x) implies ui(f(u)) > ui(x), then by weak
Maskin monotonicity we get that f(vi;u￿i) = f(u). Otherwise, let wi 2 F
such that ￿(wi) = [minff(u);f(vi;u￿i)g;maxff(u);f(vi;u￿i)g]. Then, by weak
Maskin monotonicity applied to [u;(wi;u￿i)] and also to [(vi;u￿i);(wi;u￿i)] we
have both that f(wi;u￿i) = f(u) and f(wi;u￿i) = f(vi;u￿i). Thus, since f is
a social choice function f(u) = f(vi;u￿i).
Finally, suppose that f is not strategy-proof. Then, there exists i 2 N, ui;vi 2
F, and u￿i 2 Fn￿1 such that ui(f(vi;u￿i)) > ui(f(u)). Let, without loss of
generality, f(vi;u￿i) > f(u). Note that f(vi;u￿i) 2 (f(u);rui(f(u))) or else
f(vi;u￿i) 2 (f(u);1] if there is no x > p+(ui) such that ui(f(u)) = ui(x). Let
21wi 2 S, be such that p(wi) = f(vi;u￿i) and wi(f(u)) = wi(rui(f(u))). Note
that the following holds: if ui(f(u)) = ui(x) then wi(f(u)) > wi(x) and if
ui(f(u)) > ui(x) then wi(f(u)) > wi(x). Then, by weak Maskin monotonicity,
f(wi;u￿i) = f(u). Since p(wi) = f(vi;u￿i), we have that if vi(f(vi;u￿i)) =
vi(x) then wi(f(vi;u￿i)) > wi(x) and if vi(f(vi;u￿i)) > ui(x) then wi(f(vi;u￿i)) >
wi(x). Again, by weak Maskin monotonicity, f(vi;u￿i) = f(wi;u￿i) and we get
a contradiction.
Finally, in the next proof we show that for social choice functions on Fn,
strategy-proofness and plateau-invariance imply both weak non-bossiness and
convex range.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Let f be a strategy-proof and plateau-invariant
social choice function on Fn. Let us show that f satis￿es weak non-bossiness.
Thus, let u 2 Fn, i 2 N, vi 2 F such that ui(f(u)) = ui(f(vi;u￿i)) (A1) and
vi(f(u)) = vi(f(vi;u￿i)) (A2) but f(u) 6= f(vi;u￿i). Without loss of generality,
suppose that f(u) < f(vi;u￿i). Distinguish the following three cases (A, B and
C).
Case A: f(u), f(vi;u￿i) = 2 ￿(ui) and f(u), f(vi;u￿i) = 2 ￿(vi). First note that
by (A1) and (A2), ￿(ui);￿(vi) ￿ (f(u);f(vi;u￿i)). Let !i 2 F such that
p￿(!i) = f(u) and p+(!i) = f(vi;u￿i). By strategy-proofness, f(!i;u￿i) 2
ff(u);f(vi;u￿i)g (otherwise, either i would manipulate f at u via !i, or i
would manipulate f at (!i;u￿i) via ui). Suppose that f(!i;u￿i) = f(u) (a
similar argument would work for f(!i;u￿i) = f(vi;u￿i)). Let vi 2 F such
that ￿(vi) = [p￿(vi);f(vi;u￿i)]. By strategy-proofness, f(vi;u￿i) 2 ￿(vi) (oth-
erwise, agent i would manipulate f at (vi;u￿i) via vi). Moreover, also by
strategy-proofness, f(vi;u￿i) = f(vi;u￿i) (otherwise, agent i would manipu-
late f at (vi;u￿i) via vi). By plateau-invariance, f(vi;u￿i) = f(!i;u￿i) = f(u)
which is the desired contradiction.
Case B: f(u), f(vi;u￿i) 2 ￿(ui) and f(u), f(vi;u￿i) 2 ￿(vi). Without loss
of generality, suppose that f(u) < f(vi;u￿i). Consider the following subcases:
(1) f(u) 2 Interior[￿(ui)], (2) f(u) = p￿(ui) = p￿(vi), (3) f(u) = p￿(ui),
p￿(vi) < p￿(ui) and f(vi;u￿i) 2 Interior[￿(vi)], (4) f(u) = p￿(ui), p￿(vi) <
p￿(ui), f(vi;u￿i) = p+(vi) = p+(ui), (5) f(u) = p￿(ui), p￿(vi) < p￿(ui),
f(vi;u￿i) = p+(vi), p+(ui) > f(vi;u￿i). Note that for cases 1 to 4 we ob-
tain that f(u) = f(vi;u￿i) straightforwardly by plateau-invariance. For case
5, de￿ne !i 2 F such that ￿(!i) = [p￿(ui);p+(vi)]. By plateau-invariance, we
obtain both that f(!i;u￿i) = f(u) and f(!i;u￿i) = f(vi;u￿i) which means
that f(u) = f(vi;u￿i).
Case C (identical argument to Case A): f(u), f(vi;u￿i) 2 ￿(ui) and f(u),
f(vi;u￿i) = 2 ￿(vi) (a similar argument would follow if f(u), f(vi;u￿i) = 2 ￿(ui)
and f(u), f(vi;u￿i) 2 ￿(vi)). First note that by (A2), ￿(vi) ￿ (f(u);f(vi;u￿i)).
Let !i 2 F such that ￿(!i) = [f(u);f(vi;u￿i)]. By plateau-invariance, f(!i;u￿i) =
f(u). Let !0
i 2 F such that ￿(!0
i) = [p￿(vi);f(vi;u￿i)]. By strategy-proofness,
f(!0
i;u￿i) 2 ￿(!0
i). Moreover, also by strategy-proofness, f(!0
i;u￿i) = f(vi;u￿i).
But since p+(!i) = p+(!0
i) = f(vi;u￿i) and f(!0
i;u￿i) = f(vi;u￿i);by plateau-
invariance, f(!i;u￿i) = f(!0
i;u￿i) which is the desired contradiction.
22(ii) Note that weak Maskin monotonicity is straightforward by part (i) and
Theorem 3.
(iii) Let f be a strategy-proof and plateau-invariant social choice function on
Fn. We now show that f has convex range. By contradiction suppose that
there exist x;y 2 Af, x < y, such that (x;y) ￿ AnAf. Let u;v 2 Fn such
that f(u) = x and f(v) = y. Let wi 2 F be such that ￿(wi) = [f(u);f(v)] and
w0
i 2 F be such that ￿(w0
i) = [f(u);f(u) + "] where " > 0 and f(u) + " < f(v).
Consider the following argument.
Given a preference pro￿le u we distinguish three types of agents: N1
u = fi 2 N
such that ff(u);f(v)g 2 ￿(ui)g, N2
u = fj 2 NnN1
u such that uj(f(u)) >
uj(f(v))g, and N3
u = fk 2 N such that uk(f(v)) > uk(f(u))g. We now change
agents￿preferences from u to w in the following order: ￿rst (step 1) change
preferences of each agent in N1
u, second (step 2), change preferences of each
agent in N2
u and last (step 3) change preferences of each agent in N3
u.
Step 1. If i 2 N1
u announces wi, by plateau-invariance f(wi;u￿i) = f(u).
Repeating the same argument #N1
u times, changing the preference of a single
agent in N1




Step 2. If j 2 N2
u announces w0






















Repeating the same argument #N2
u times, changing the preference of a single
agent in N2




Step 3. If k 2 N3












otherwise, k would manipulate f at (wN1
u;wN2
u;uN3
u) via wk. Repeating the
same argument #N3
u times, changing the preference of a single agent in N3
u




Beginning from v, and using a similar argument than above we get that
f(w) = f(v) which is the desired contradiction.
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